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Signature: In today's changing international environment, counterinsurgency in sup-. port of an ally or to encourage regional stability is an important missions for the US military. The operational commander will face the task of translating the strategic goals of that mission into the tactical actions that will Accomplish those national goals. In preparing to conduct counte-rinsurgency operations, the operational commander must consider the cultural, military, and political aspects of the conflict. Two of the more successful operations that could provide guidance in the preparation are the experience of the British Army in Dhofar from 1965-1975, and the experience of the US military in El Salvador from 1975-1985. Both provide valuable examples of techniques and procedures that proved successful, and could be applied to future counterinsurgency operations. 
Abstract of THE ROLE OF THE OPERATIONAL COMNM4ANDER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
In today's changing international environment, counterinsurgency in support of an ally or to support regional stability is an important mission for the US military. The operational commander will face the task of translating the strategic goals of that mission into the tactical actions that will achieve those national, strategic goals.
In preparing to conduct counterinsurgency operations, the operational commander can find numerous examples of that type of operation in history. Two of the more successful operations that could provide guidance are the experience of the British Army in Dhofar from [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] , and the experience of the US military in El Salvador from 1975 Salvador from -1985 In both cases, the factors contributing to the success of the supporting nations, Great Britain and the US, fall into three categories: cultural, military, and political. The three categories provide a framework for the operational commander to analyze the problem. determine appropriate courses of action, and prepare the most effective force structure for the mission. Dhofar and El
Salvador also provide valuable examples of techniques and procedures that pro-vod successful, and could be applied to future counterinsurgency operations.
In conclusion, the operational commander will be a key player in future counterixtsurgency
operations. H-is role as the link between the strategic and tactical levels is essential in i -oes-Flon -For nations have been struggling with them for many years, and are likely to do so in the future.
As long as there are ideological differences and economic and social imbalances in the world, the conditions which give rise to an insurgency will exist, and counterinsurgency will follow.
Counterinsurgency, as defined by JCS Pub 1-02, is "those military, paramilitary, political economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." 1 From the perspective of the operational commander, counterinsurgency may not Vc; biq primary mission, and it may not be the mission for which he is best prepared, but it is one that cannot be ignored. "The role of the CINC is critical. His regional perspective is at the operational level of the conflict. In conjunction and coordination with the country teams, the CINC identifies and applies military and certain humanitarian and civic action resources to achieve US goals. With proper and timely employment, these resources minimize the likelihood for need of US combat involvement."I Two factors can complicate the task of applying resources effectively while preventing escalation and threatening the involvement of US combat forces. First, in the total experiences that a nation and its military forces draw on in developing military policy and doctrine, counterinsurgency experience is probably relatively limited and may not be overwhelmingly positive. Military and political involvement in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation is often controversial in both the nation providing assistance and in the host nation receiving assistance.
In the two cases examined in this paper, there was some reluctance and confusion in the I supported and supporting nations about the role of the supporting nation's military in the internal stuggle of the supported nation. h'ile the assistance is proiided at the request of the country battling the insurgency, the details of providing the assistance can lead to disagreements.
Secondly, in looking at preious counterinsurgencies for guidance in dealing with them in the future, the most striking characteristic is the dissinilarity between insurgencies.
Insurgencies can exist all over the world, targets can be military, political, social or economic, and the insurgents objectives can range from forcing change within the existing regime to the complete overthrow of the regime. In view of the vagueness and despite progress in the development of doctrine and force structure for counterinsurgency, the operational commander may still be left looking for strategy and tactics that have a reasonable chance of success.
Fortunately, the operational commander does have some information to guide his development of a counterinsurgency plan. There are historic common guidelines that have, been effective in past counterinsurgency operations, but they are broad in scope, and apply more at the strategic than the operational level. These common guidelines are: 1) conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the situation in the threatened country; 2) identify measures to address the causes of discontent in the threatened country; 3) develop effective military and police capabilities in the threatened country; and 4) mobilize all aspects of national power to support the counterinsurgency operation.'
The focus of the operational commander must be narrowed without losing sight of those guidelines that may influence strategic policy and objectives. and running into inhospitable desert in the north and east.' It is this mountainous area, and its inhabitants that are at the center of the British experience in Dhofar.
The situation that created the political, economic, and social conditions that gave rise to the Dhofar insurgency date back to 1932 when Sultan Said Bin Taimur assumed control of the poorly developed nation of Muscat and Oman. Never a popular leader, the Sultan's support among the people continued to decline as they saw oil revenues generated in their country making the Sultan and foreign investors wealthy while bringing absolutely no social or economic progress to the majority. The Sultan's response to the concerns of the people was largely one of repression and increasing distrust, especially of the Jebelis, the tribal Muslims living in the mountains of Dhofar.' Seeing no alternative and acting against the dictates of the Sultan, niany Dhofaris of the Jebel left Dhofar in search of education and better paying jobs.
By 1964, some of those Dhofaris who had traveled abroad returned home to demand from the Sultan the fair treatment to which they were entitled in their own country. This group of educated Jebelis formed the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) in 1965. At its inception, the DLF was a nationalist movement with the goal of reform within the structure of the existing government? Initial unrest in Dhofar "had no political base or motivation but had its roots in the social and economic ills of the region". 4 If the Sultan had responded to the demands of the DLF at this point, the guerrilla war that followed could possibly' have been averted. But. by refusing to address the economic and social problems of the people, and, in fact, taking an even harsher approach toward the tribes of the Jebel, the Sultan contributed to the conditions which paved the way for the Marxist influence that transformed the locally focused DI While the British military contributed to the improved efficiency of the SAF, the creation and implementation of a reform plan by the new leadership actually changed the direction of the struggle. British advice that had been provided earlier and ignored by his father was incorporated into Qaboos' plan that addressed Oman's internal and external problems.
The ftirst element was an offer of amnesty to all who had previously opposed the government. The purpose was to draw the Jebeli tribesmen supporting the insurgents away from them by ofi~ring money, and the promise to replace the war zones with v11ages containing hospitals, schools, and homes." The amnesty plan was the first step in the larger process of separating the people from the rebels. The next step was to organize the former guerrillas into a local militia group called a Firqat. The third, and perhaps most important element of the reform plan was the nationwide program of development with emphasis on Dhofar. The program was designed to have both immediate and long-term effects to turn the people away from the insurgents and back to the government. The immediate plans focused on providing medical care for the Jebeli people and veterinary services for their cattle, the main source of their livelihood."' The long-term plan was for Cixil Action Teams (CATs) to build in several areas a "centre" that would provide services and form the nucleus of a village that the people would have the ability and the incentive to protect from commnunist infiltration. At the outset, much of the building and the protection was performed by military forces. 1 7 The fourth element of Qaboos' plan was a more aggressive approach to military action against the rebels. The primary focus was on limiting resupply from and the use of bases in the PDRY. This required the SAF to change its mode of operation. Prior to 1971. the SAF operated in the mountains against the insurgents during favorable weather, but in monsoon season, July through September, they would pull back to less exposed bases to wait out the rain and fog. However, the rebels were mostly Jebeli tribesmen by birth and did not have the same reservations about operating in the mountains during the monsoon. Actually, they found it to be the best time of the year to move supplies from the PDRY in preparation for the upcoming campaign season against the SAF because their work was unopposed. Qaboos, %ith encouragement and assistance from his British military advisers, established SAF garrisons in the mountains from which the SAF conducted operations against the rebels year round. This constant pressure on the rebels effected their ability to resupply, and improved the effectiveness and morale of the SAF.P
With their source of supply from the PDRY severely scaled back by SAF operations, the rebels sought assistance from Libya, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, but the tide had begun to turn in favor of the government forces as the rebels suffered increasing numbers of casualties, and weapons losses. 19 By 1972, the SAF had gained the initiative, but were unsure of how to proceed against the rebels. With the help of British advisers, two objectives were established:
1) destroy insurgent forces in the east, and 2) stop the flow of supplies from the west.' 
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CHAPTER III: EL SALVADOR
The insurgency in El Salvador is a function of social and economic problems that date back to the nineteenth century when the struggle for arable land created a class of ruling landowners and a class of subjugated peasants who worked the land. Until the early to mid-twentieth century, the landowners were concerned almost exclusively with their own economic well-being, and had little concern for the relative poverty of the campesinos. The campesinos, with no economic or political power, had no means of redress for their grievances.'
The tense situation began to deteriorate in the nineteen-twenties and thirties, and led to an inevitable confrontation between the two groups. During this period, the international economy was in a significant downward trend, and the landowners felt the effects of declining prices for their products. Also during this time, the workers began to respond to efforts at organization, and when the situation turned violent in January of 1932, civilians, military personnel and campesinos were killed. Following the Matanza (massacre), which lives in infamy in the minds of Salvadorans still, one of the labor leaders who was later to give his name to the struggle of the landless class, Augustin Farabundo Marti, was executed. 2 The government grudgingly undertook some extremely limited reforms after the Matanza but the result was very little improvement for a very small percentage of campesinos. The most significant result was the response of the military and the oligarchy against the campesinos. The ability and desire of the workers to organize brought the military and the oligarchy to the conclusion that only by their cooperative efforts and mutual support would they be able to maintain control. For the next twenty years, the repressive rule of the oligarchy with the reinforcement of the military went unchallenged.'
The changes that took place in El Salvador in the decade of the fifties brought some improvement to the country in terms of the infrastructure, but there was still no substantive progress for the workers. Foreign investment increased, but the benefits accrued mostly to the investors because the industries were largely capital intensive, as opposed to labor intensive, and so the investment failed to create a significant number of new jobs. The national economy did not improve appreciably because the peasants continued working the land and not generating the income to participate in the expanding economy. At the same time, the oligarchy refused to accept the only real solution -land reform and economic redistribution.'
On the political scene, there was some effort to develop a party that was to the right of the communist-backed workers' groups, and to the left of the military-backed oligarchy. This was the beginning of the Christian Democratic Party, and it met with marginal success in its early days. However, the struggle for political power between the ardent anti-Communists and the reform-minded Christian Democrats was did little to solve the problems of the people, and the strength of the communist insurgency continued to grow.'
In the national election of 1972, the Christian Democratic candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte, appeared to be winning over the intended winner of the ruling elite, Colonel Molina.
The military and the landowners were unwilling to allow Duarte to win, and the election wag undermined the efforts to achieve the second objective of the National Campaign Plan, safeguarding the economic infrastructure. Salvadoran forces were spread too thin to offer protection from the guerrillas in all areas, and efforts at organizing local Civil Defense forces did not meet expectations. As a result, the guerrillas were able to continue their destruction of the economy and caused a number of programs to be abandoned.' 7 Left unchecked, the inability of the Salvadoran military to protect the people and government programs from the destructive efforts of the insurgents, the National Campaign Plan was destined to be only marginally successful.
The government was accomplishing its third objective of improving its image among the people by the visibility of its efforts to defeat the insurgents. But, the failure of the government to organize, train, and equip Civil Defense forces adequately undermined the development programs, and indicated a mutual lack of confidence between the government and the people.
"The military tended to distrust the villagers who were to form the patrols, so they were poorly, organized, often unarmed, and poorly trained." 8 By the mid-eighties, the war was stalemated. The Salvadoran forces continued to improve their counterinsurgency operations, and the insurgents responded by changing their tactics.
When the insurgents lacked sufficient power to conduct large unit operations, they resorted to small raids. The Salvadoran military was able to prevent their consolidation of strength, but was unable to keep them from their campaign of destruction throughout the country." 9 Negotiations to bring the insurgents into the political process began in 1984, but the willingness of the participants to cooperate fluctuated with the military situation in the field.
Neither side was willing to compromise when they felt they had a chance for a decisive military victory. Considerable progress has been made, and the progress continues to date, but El
Salvador is still waiting for a lasting peace. 
CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
The two previous chapters have examined the general course of events in two nations' struggles to overcome an insurgency, and the assistance provided by the government and military forces of another nation with interests in the cause of peace and stability in the region. In both cases, some degrce of success against the insurgents was achievcd, but not cvery undertaking was successful.
From the experiences of the British forces in Dhofar and the US forces in El Salvador, some common lessons can be learned despite the obvious geographical and cultural differences between the two countries facing the insurgency.
Counterinsurgency is a potential mission for an operational commander in any theater of operations. It is therefore useful to look at what has gone right and wrong in previous experiences to increase the chances for success in the next confrontation. It is also important to consider counterinsurgency operations from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels because, just as in any other type of military operation, all three levels must be fully coordinated and effectively tied together, and it is difficult to consider the operational level apart from the other two.
One of the key roles of the operational commander is to link the tactical and strategic levels together. At first glance, a counterinsurgency operation may not appear to have a definitive operationa! level. Counterinsurgency from the US perspective could be perceived as primarily special operations forces training the supported nation's military at the tactical level in support of our national policy to promote democracy and stability in a given nation. What, then, is the role of the operational commander? In fact, the role of the operational commander in counterinsurgency is precisely what it is in all military operations -to relate the national strategic objectives to be achieved by military means to the tactical level. Without the operational commander as the conduit connecting the strategic and tactical levels, the essential capacity to communicate and maintain coherency between the national command authority and forces in contact with the enemy is lost.
While the responsibility of the operational commander to link the tactical and strategic levels is the same in counterinsurgency as in any other conflict, the execution of that res~ponsibility is likely to be significantly different from the conventional conflicts that most immediately come to mind as the purview of the operational commander. Consequently, the doctrine, procedures, and even personal habits developed from experience must be reevaluated to judge their applicability. The operational commander may also face some institutional and organizational biases to which he will have to adjust. As one author put it, ".. The first step in examining two counterinsurgency operations for similarities from which to learn is to recognize and internalize the fact that there are differences. Every conflict has unique characteristics, and that is particularly true of counterinsurgency operations. At the strategic level, the causes of the insurgency, the response of the aggrieved segment of society, and possibly even the alternatives to which that segment turns may all have striking similarities. But at the operational level, similarities can be nothing more than coincidence and must be considered with caution to avoid the risk of being blinded by preconceived notions.
In Dhofar and El Salvador, the lessons to be learned for the operational commander can be grouped into three categories: military, political and cultural. One of these areas may take primacy over the other two at various points throughout the campaign, but careful consideration must be given to all three at all times. However, there will always be a first among equals in these three categories, and that is the political aspect. An insurgency has its roots in the internal political problems of a nation, not in an issue of national sovereignty. 2 The insurgents may receive suppr1rt from an external source, but the heart and soul of the problem is the internal threat, and it is essential to treat the problem, not the symptoms. Because the root cause of the problem is essentially political, the long term solution must also be political.
In terms of sequencing, the military requirements of the counterinsurgency may precede the political measures in order to respond to the military activity of the insurgents, but the cultural aspect is timeless, and must be taken into consideration from start to finish. The cultural dimension is so important because it is the people against which the military and political activities of both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents are targeted. "The center of an insurgency's strength and the key to its survival and growth is the covert political infrastructure deeply embedded in and permeating the general population.. .At the same time, the besieged governent's power also ultimately depends upon the support and loyalty of the general population." 3 In essence, the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency operation is the people.
The support of the people is dependent on an understanding of their culture in order to develop and implement a solution that does not threaten their identity, values, and way ,)f life. The operational commander is a key player in this aspect because he is close enough to the tactical situation to appreciate the cultural dynamics, and, at the same time, he is connected to the policy-makers so that those dynamics can be factored into the planning process. Religion shapes the lives of the majority of the Salvadorans, who express their religious feelings through some kind of affiliation to the Church." 7 In part because of the people's dies to it, the Catholic Church became very involved in the conflict Whether the influence of the Church in the conflict was good or bad is a matter of perspective, but it was a force that could not be ignored.
The lesson learned from the experience of the insurgents and the government forces about the cultural dimension cannot be overlooked. The genuine, freely-given support of the people must be the basis of a plan in order for it to work. The cultural dimension can appear insignificant in the face of more threatening issues, but it can be the weak link if not fully considered. It will be the job of the operational commander to monitor the tactical situation to make sure that it is always in the minds of the forces on the ground, and to sensitize them to an awareness of potential problems. At the same time, he must ensure through his advice and input to the strategic level that all policy matters are considered within the context of the cultural dimension.
The operational commander will be most directly involved in the military aspect of the couniterinsurgency operation. His role essentially will be to apply the appropriate forces and equipment in the appropriate manner to defeat the insurgents. It is critical, however, that the operational commander never lose sight of the fact that defeating the insurgents is one step in the process to the ultimate goal of establishing stability. There are several missions that can be accomplished by military forces, and the actual destruction of the insurgents is only one.
The first step is to determine what the correct force structure should be in terms of numbers of personnel and types of equipment. To some extent, depending on the situation, personnel and equipment will be influenced by domestic political constraints in both the supporting and the supported countries. In the case of Dhofar and El Salvador. domestic political constraints in Great
Britain and the United States were one of the main reasons for limits on the force structure. For the british, the long period of involvement in the Middle East was in a state of transition, and there was little support for large numbers of forces in Oman. In the case of the US in El Salvador, the maximum number of military personnel authorized in country at any given time was fifty five." In both cases, the senior military leaders in country identified the critical tasks to be accomplished, and determined the optimal use of available resources to reach the goal. In a period of shrinking budgets and declining force levels, simnilar restrictions will apply in future operations, and the operational commander will be faced with the same requirement to prioritize tasks for accomplishment with limited resources. An essential part of that task may be to inform military and civilian leaders at the strategic level that the strategic objectives as stated cannot be achieved with the resources provided, and that the objectives or the resources will have to be adjusted.
Not surprisingly, in both cases the decision was made to employ special operations forces to train the armed forces of the supported country, and in both cases, this approach was relatively successful. The Salvadoran military had been trained and equipped for a conventional conflict, and their tactics did not work against the insurgents. Similarly, initial operations undertaken by the SAF were not making significant progress against the Dhofar rebels. But with the training and assistance provided by the US and British forces respectively, both became more effective. The key point is that in both cases, assistance was provided to the supported nation to enable them to fight their own war rather than an attempt to fight it for them. In neither case were actual combat forces provided. US experience in Vietnam demonstrates the futility of employing conventional US combat forces in an insurgent situation, and it is unlikely that the people or national policy-makers will forget that experience in the near future. Furthermore, as quoted previously from JCS Pub 3-07. part of the objective of counterinsurgent operations is to "minimize the likelihood for need of US combat involvement. "
The role of the operational commander in future insurgencies will be to most effectively use the limited number of forces available to him. Special operations forces will undoubtedly be among them due to their unique capabilities, and ability to train forces in counterinsurgency techniques. It is possible that conventional forces could be used to augment special operations forces, and in that event, care must be taken to ensure that they fully understand their mission and their applicability in counterinsurgency. Neglect in this area could result in discouragement among these forces because they are not engaged in what they understand to be their prinary function, and that could lead to an overall decrease in their effectiveness.
In addition to their mission of training conventional forces in counterinsurgency tactics, special purpose forces personnel skilled in civil affairs and psychological operations should also be included in the force structure. The British used psychological operations very effectively in response to similar attempts by the insurgents to gain the support of the people. In El Salvador, psychological operations were used extensively to appeal to the insurgents to defect. One innovative and successful technique was to build a campaign using various media means around a prominent guerrilla leader who had defected."° The former guerrilla leader was portrayed as a national hero in an attempt to lure others away from the insurgents, and to build their confidence in the treatment that they would receive upon their surrender to the government.
Ci6Il affairs personnel can work with the host nation military as trainers in the area of cihic.
action and community defense and development. While the supported military forces are gaining expertise in chic action programs, this approach also serves to reinforce the idea that military operations are merely one part of a larger effort to make fundamental changes in the country for the benefit of the people, and that the military supports the entire effort.
In Dhofar and El Salvador, insurgent forces were limited to conducting ground operations, and their use of air and naval forces was primarily resupply from external sources. But the fact that the enemy is primarily a ground force does not limit the operational commander to the use of ground forces in the counterinsurgency effort. Counterinsurgency can and should be a joint operation that employs a variety of assets available to the C-NC. For example, in El Salvador, Air Force pilots were trained by US pilots to improved their ability to proMvide close air support to ground units.
Additionally, if resupply of the insurgents is being conducted by sea and air, host nation naval and air forces trained by US forces could be the most appropriate assets to stem the flow of supplies.
However, the operational commander must take great care to ensure that he does not step across the line that separates training to improve supported nation capabilities and the use of US forces and equipment to compensate for capabilities that the host nation does not possess.
Crossing that line could lead to a level of US forces involvement that is unacceptable for military or political reasons. Again, this highlights the essential task of the operational commander to carefully select the right types and numbers of US assets that will be employed, and to assist leaders at both the tactical and strategic levels in keeping focused on the mission of US forces involved in the counterinsurgency operation.
The right type and amount of equipment is as important a factor as is the personnel. Much of the decision-making about the equipment provided is made at the strategic level, but it has great significance at the operational and tactical levels. Because of this, the operational commander may be required to extend himself into that strategic arena to ensure that the decision-makers fully understand the situation at the lower levels, and the impact of the equipment that they are proposing to provide. The case of aircraft in El Salvador is illustrative.
US aircraft provided to the Salvadoran armed forces increased their fire power against the insurgents, but the very nature of the insurgency meant that, at times, the effects of the bombing were felt as much by the civilians as by the rebels. The risk of civilian casualties calls into question the appropriateness and benefit of the bombing campaign when civilians and belligerents are intermixed as they are likely to be in a rural insurgent situation. Eventually, fewer bombing missions due to a shortage of trained pilots, and improved accuracy of the bombing as a result of US Air Force training reduced the number of civilian casualties." Equipment provided without adequate training can do more harm than good.
A secondary benefit of de-emphasizing attacks by air was to put emphasis back onto the ground operations where the military was forced to go out among the population to find and defeat the insurgents. 12 This presence of the government forces can have a significant impact on the attitude of th., people who have gotten used to seeing the insurgents among them, and from that may conclude that they are their only alternative for change.
In Dhofar, the British provided small arms, artillery for increased fire power, and vehicles to make the SAF a more mobile force. The weapons were used successfully against the rebels while minimizing civilian casualties. Aircraft were used primarily for resupply and transport of ground forces, especially for the permanent garrisons that proved effective in isolathqg the rebels in the Jebel from their source of supply in the PDRY.
In counterinsurgency, as in any operation, intelligence is a key ingredient. However, collection means and assistance in the process must be tailored to the intelligence source. There is a potential disparity between support from high technology collection means and low technology sources.
The insurgents may be susceptible to a limited amount of signals intelligence collection that can be conducted most effectively by host nation forces who do not face a language barrier, and analytical assistance can be provided by US forces. Imagery intelligence from US assets may be useful in database development. The primary source, however, is likely to be human intelligence, and the operational commander must be prepared to exploit two main sources -the civilian population in areas where the insurgents are active, and the insurgents themselves.
In order to collect information from the people, the operational commander wrill have to work closely with the host nation government and military forces to create an environment in which the people are confident that they will not suffer reprisals at the hands of the insurgents. The people must also be confident that they will not be mistreated by government forces. advisers, but were reluctant to accept the US plan outright. While the final version of the plan did reflect heavy US influence, the Salvadorans felt ownership of it because they had sufficient input to the final version.'" In all aspects of the counterinsurgency operation, the host nation government must control the direction to ensure that no one loses sight of the ultimate goal, and that the solution to the insurgency problem is one that will stand the test of time. A plan such as the National Campaign Plan is essential in maintaining that control. Qaboos' plan for reform served the same purpose in Dhofar. However, if the plan is not supported wholeheartedly by the key political and military leaders in the country, its chances for success can be diminished. In El Salvador, the military did not have complete trust in the people and so refused to train and equip the Civil Defense forces for them to adequately perform their mission. Consequently, the plan did not meet its potential for improving social and economic conditions in El Salvador.
In both Dhofar and El Salvador, it is ob'ious that the right combination of military assistance and political leadership dedicated to solving the problem must go hand in hand to defeat an insurgency. One without the other is insufficient, and at best, can only meet short-term objectives while the more serious long-term problem continues to fester.
CILAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS
After examining the counterinsurgency efforts in Dh•o•ar and El Salvador. one might logically conclude that they do provide guidance for the operational commander in future counterinsurgency operations. The two cases can assist in the process of organizing, planning and planning executing the mission by emphasizing the cultural, military and political actions in which the operational commander will play a significant role.
First and always, the operational commander will consider the cultural aspect. No action.
political or military can be divorced from it. More than in conventional conflict, the culture of the people is inextricably linked to the operation. PhysicaLly, part of the problem is separating the people from the belligerents but the belligerents are not an invading force from another nation.
Rather, the belligerents are an internal force, and while they may have external support, they are part of the same culture that the fighting is attempting to preserve.
The cultural dimension is an enormous one with countless aspects. It is impossible to Wst all the potential situations that the operational commander could face, so an accurate and thorough evaluation of the situation on the ground is critical. Only by doing so can he obtain a real appreciation for the factors at work. The operational commander is the key player in this process because of his unique position in contact and coordination with the tactical and strategic levels,
The operational commander will have the responsibility of implementing the military component of the US counterinsurgency strategy. The most difficult task that he will face will be matching the assigned objectives with the means available. In counterinsurgency, more is not necessarily better, and overwhelming force is not an option that is likely to be available nor would it be effective ifit was. Forces must be chosen judiciously and with specific objectives in mind
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that support the objectives of the nation being assisted. Care must be taken to ensure that US capabilities brought to bear on the problem complement those of the supported nation rather than supplant them. Technologically advanced equipment can support the effort, but it must be applied with extreme caution and closely monitored to ensure that the effect that it has is the intended one.
Most importantly, the operational commander must recognize that his military role in the counterinsurgency operation is a supporting one. The most essential task will be training provided to host nation military forces so that they can do their job of supporting their government in solving its problem. For the US military, the supporting role can be a difficult one. There will be a "take charge" tendency that must be constrained. The operational commander must see himself as a member of the supporting cast. That support is absolutely essential to success, but it can not consutme the job of the primary participants, the government and military forces of the host nation.
The operational commander will also play a key role in the political dimension of the counterinsurgency effort, and he will be required to work closely with US and host nation government officials. The most important and potentially the most difficult task in the political arena will be translating the military situation into terms that will be accepted and understood by both US and host nation officials. Only by making that translation understood will the operational commander be able to make honest assessments of the situation and adjustments as necessary.
The effort can be complicated by differing and even contradictory ideas of what the results should be and what the best way to achieve them is. In Dhofar, the rise to power by Sultan Qaboos was a clear turing point in the political direction of the conflict. This was the essential step to the solution of the problem. In El Salvador, the process was more evolutionary and more complicated. The attitudes of key players were not quickly or decisively changed. The means to the end were not always agreed upon, and not everyone was supportive of the intricacies of the National Campaign Plan. It is very possible that the operational commander will face similar ambiguous situations in the future.
The role of the operational commander in counterinsurgency vwill be a challenging one that will require innovative thinking and attitude adjustments. As in any operation, the operational level is the critical one that ties the national strategy to the individual efforts on the ground. Inappropriate action at the tactical level can undermine the strategic objective that it is intended to achieve. At the same time, if the strategy in unclear or unattainable with the resources available, tactical success will be for naught. The role of the operational commander is to maintain the ties that keep the tactical effort and the s 4 rategic goal connected.
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